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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of 
the Estate of GERALD DALLAS 
THOMAS, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7221 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF F.AJCTS 
This appeal is from a verdict and judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff below in the amount of $50,000, on account of 
the death of Gerald Dallas Thomas, an employee of The 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, which 
occurred at Sunnyside, Utah, on October 11, 1947. * On 
*Throughout this brief, the parties will be referred to as in the 
trial court. All italics are supplied. . 
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November 5, 1947, Dwight L. King, a lawyer in the office :fit 
of the attorneys who prosecuted this action, was appointed ~~ l 
Administrator of the Estate of the deceased and commenced :trau 
this action as party plaintiff (R. 1, 2~5). Summons was ·Ji, 
served on defendant on November 10, 1947 (R. 10). :{r: 
The railroad tracks, coal bin, and other physical fea-
tures incident to the case are fully illustrated by plaintiff's 
Exhibit A, a scale map of a portion of the yards at Sunnyside, 
Utah, prepared by a civil engineer in defendant's engineer-
ing department, which map was adopted and introduced by 
the plaintiff during the trial as his own exhibit (R. 116, 
350) ; also by plaintiff's Exhibits C toR, inclusive, which are 
photographs of sections of the railroad tracks involved and 
views of the coal bin taken after the accident (R. 32). The 
views of the bin were introduced in evidence over defendant's 
objection (R. 125-127). 
Sunnyside is located in rather a wide canyon running 
generally in a north to south direction. Two parallel sets 
of track, known as the main line track and the load track 
run up and down the canyon, in addition to connecting stor-
age and switch tracks (R. 156-158). At the upper end of 
the canyon near the Town of Sunnyside is located a tipple 
where coal is loaded into railroad cars. Some two thousand 
feet south of the coal tipple, a switch track known as the 
"bin track" branches off from the load track and runs in a 
southeasterly direction along the canyon hillside for about 
3,000 feet (R. 11, 131-133). At the southern end of the 
bin track is a large box-like coal bin owned by the Utah 
Fuel Company and used for the storage of slack coal. The 
:eooa 
.!ii1e 
:liE 
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slack coal is used for fuel in the nearby coke ovens of the 
Utah Fuel Company (R. 290). The Utah F'uel Company 
operates small electric "larry" cars to carry to coal from the 
bin to the ovens ( R. 29~29'1) . The larry cars, similar to 
small railroad cars, run on a narrow gauge track underneath 
the coal bin structure and between the bin and the coke 
ovens (R. 123-124). Standard gauge railroad track runs 
along the top of the bin structure as a continuation of the 
bin track. As shown by Exhibit A, the bin track approaches 
the bin over a wood trestle 43.6 feet long. The bin itself is 
198 feet in length (R. 123). At the south end of the bin 
and bin track, a bumper device was installed prior to the 
accident. The railroad tracks curved upward and inward to 
a point on the bumper ( R. 135) . 
The accident to Thomas occurred when two loaded cars 
of coal were being "dropped" from a position on the load 
track just north of and above the switch leading to the bin 
track, through the switch and onto the bin track and along 
the bin track out to the coal bin (R. 16,S .. l70; R. 290-297). 
Thomas, the head brakeman of the train crew, mounted the 
brake platform of the lead or most southerly of the two cars. 
In "dropping" these two cars to the bin, it was Thomas' job 
to regulate and control their speed by means of the Ajax 
brake on the car he was riding and to bring the cars to a 
stop when the cars had reached the desired spot on the bin 
(R. 149, 178). The total distance to be traveled by the cars 
from their position north of the bin track switch to their 
intended position on top of the coal bin was more than one-
half mile (R. 122-12'3,). The grade of the bin track for about 
the first 300 feet after entering the bin track was 3.5%, 
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then for about the next 500 feet the grade tapered off from 
3.5% to 0.5o/o, and for the remaining 2200 feet to the coal 
bin the grade was approximately level (R. 118...:122, Exhibit 
A). The grade enabled cars to roll from their position on 
the load track into the bin track and out to the coal bin by 
force of gravity (R. 149-150). Although the grade of the 
bin track slackened appreciably after the first 700 to 800 
feet, application and regulation of a brake on loaded cars 
was necessary to bring the cars to a stop on the bin (R. 151, 
178). 
The two cars were ridden towards the bin by Thomas 
as planned, but instead of being stopped on the bin as in-
tended, the cars continued on over the south end of the bin 
structure and fell 34 feet to the ground below (R. 170-171, 
299). Afterwards, Thomas was found in the wreckage of 
the cars at the base of the bin. He was unconscious and had 
sustained fatal injuries. He died a few hours later in the 
hospital at Dragerton, Utah, without regaining conscious-
ness (R. 170). 
The complaint filed by the plaintiff in this case alleged 
that the defendant was responsible for the death of Thomas 
by reason of its negligence in each of the following particu-
lars (R. 4-5) : 
(a) That defendant used and adopted a dangerous 
and unsafe method to place cars on the coal bin, in that, 
instead of using a locomotive to control the speed of cars 
as they were moved onto the bin, the cars were placed in 
motion and Thomas was required to control their speed and 
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momentum by means of the hand brake which was insuf-
ficient for that purpose. 
(b) That defendant violated the Safety Appliance Act 
in using and hauling on its tracks a car not equipped with 
a sufficient hand brake, to wit, the hand brake on the lead 
car of the two cars loaded with coal ; that as a result of the 
insufficiency of the hand brake, it was impossible for 
Thomas by use of said brake in the usual, ordinary and 
proper manner to control the speed of the cars or to bring 
them to a stop on the bin. 
(c) That defendant failed to provide Thomas with a 
safe place to work, in that, he was required to ride the cars 
loaded with coal in reliance upon the hand brake of the lead-
ing car to control the cars and bring them to a stop on the 
coal bin, without making the coal bin safe for an eventuality 
such as occurred, in that no bumper timbers or bumper de-
vices were placed at the end of the bin for the purpose of 
stopping cars whose speed or momentum had not been 
otherwise controlled. 
(d) That defendant negligently planned its work in-
cident to the moving of the two cars loaded with coal onto 
the bin, and negligently built and constructed the bin so as to 
cause a hazardous situation to exist. 
Each and all of the foregoing counts of negligence were 
denied by the defendant, and by way of affirmative defense 
the defendant alleged the contributory negligence of the 
decedent as a proximate cause of the accident (R. 12). 
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Before trial, the defendant also filed an amended an-
swer, consisting of a set-off and counterclaim (R. 16·18). 
In this pleading, the defendant asked that the sum of 
$4,923.98 be set off against any judgment the plaintiff 
might be awarded in this action. It was alleged that such 
set-off was due because of sums contributed by the defen-
dant to the Treasury of the United States for the benefit 
of the deceased, and which now were due and payable to 
the widow and minor children of the deceased on account of 
the injury and death for which plaintiffs action was brought. 
The plaintiff filed a demurrer (R. 19) and a motion to strike 
(R. 20) the foregoing set-off. On February 17, 1948, after 
hearing and argument, the trial court granted the plain-
tiff's demurrer and sustained the motion to strike (R. 24). 
Trial of the case was commenced on February 18, 1947 
before the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr. and consumed three 
days. Evidence was introduced by both sides. At the close 
of the defendant's case, a motion for a directed verdict was 
submitted to the court by the defendant (R. 3'52-354). The 
motion was denied ( R. 3154) . The case was then submitted 
to the jury, under instructions by the court, and a verdict 
was returned in favor of the plaintiff for $50,000. No dimi-
nution was made from the verdict by reason of any con-
tributory negligence on the part of the deceased (R. 33B). 
Since error is predicated in this appeal upon the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence to support a verdict based on at 
least three of the counts of negligence charged against the 
defendant and submitted to the jury, the relevant evi-
dence with respect to these particular issues is set forth 
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in considerable detail as part of the statement of facts in 
this case: 
Evidence re alleged viola.tion of the Safety· Appliance 
Act. 
The plaintiff called only two witnesses who knew any-
thing at all concerning the events conected with the acci-
dent. The first of these witnesses was Ernest E. Barnes, 
conductor of the train crew, the other witness was John T. 
Schauster, rear brakeman of the same crew. 
Barnes testified as follows: 
He had worked at Sunnyside as a conductor and as a 
brakeman for short periods at various times from 19'3;6 up 
to the date of the accident (R. 142). He had been working 
there for about five days just prior to the accident to Thomas 
(R. 190). During the periods that Barnes had worked at 
Sunnyside, no particular custom or method was used by 
switching crews in taking loads of coal from the load track 
onto the bin track and spotting them on the coal bin (R. 146). 
On occasions, the loaded cars would be dropped and spotted 
by gravity directly from the load track to the bin (R. 146). 
In so doing, the movement usually was started above the 
bin track. A brakeman would release the hand brakes and 
ride the cars to the bin. The cars were controlled by means 
of the hand brakes (R. 149). When cars were dropped, the 
speed usually would be attained during the first 500 or 600 
feet due to the heavier grade on that portion of the bin track 
(R. 149-150), thereafter the grade of the track was com-
paratively level all the way to the bin (R. 150). 
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On the morning of October 11, shortly before the acci-
dent, the switch engine had been derailed. Barnes told 
Schauster and Thomas, the two brakemen, that the two 
loaded coal cars would be dropped out to the bin. Thomas 
got on the brake platform of the first of the two cars, that 
is, the lead car or the one furtherest down hill (R. 168). The 
brake on this car was an Ajax brake, which is a power brake. 
It is a very good brake. You don't have to use a brake club 
on it; it is strictly a hand brake (R. 168). The cars were 
standing with their brakes set. The brakes were holding 
properly (R. 180). At the point where the cars were then 
standing, there was a fairly steep grade. Barnes observed 
that the brakes on the two cars going to the bin were oper-
ative and holding the loaded cars on the grade. After 
Thomas. got on the brake platform at the front end of the 
lead car, Schauster got on the second car. Schauster released 
the brake on his car first. The two bin track cars then were 
disengaged from the other cars in the cut. The two cars 
then were being held on the grade merely by the one brake 
on the end of the lead car that Thomas was riding (R. 181). 
This one brake properly was holding the t~o cars on the 
3% grade (R. 18'1). Thomas then released the brake and 
the two cars started to roll toward the bin track (R. 182). 
After Thomas had started down the bin track with the 
two cars, Schauster and Barnes proceeded to drop the two 
remaining cars of the cut down toward the storage track. 
As Barnes was riding the remaining cars into the storage 
track, he saw the two cars on the bin track from 400 to 600 
feet from the bin (R. 168 .. 169). When Barnes saw the cars, 
he remarked to Schauster, "I believe they are going too fast" 
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(R. 169). When this comment was made, it was Barnes' ob-
servation that there was something unusual about the move-
ment of the cars (R. 177). Barnes was apprehensive so he 
continued to watch (R. 180). At the one half mile distance 
he was from the cars on the bin track, Barnes would "guess" 
the cars were going anywhere from 8 to 10 miles per hour 
(R. 169, 193). His statement concerning the speed of the 
cars was purely an estimate. It is possible the cars 
were moving faster than 8 to 10 miles per hour. It was a 
dark and gloomy day (R. 175). Barnes could not state how 
fast the cars were moving as they moved across the wood 
trestle on the approach to this bin. The cars had to be mov-
ing past an object before Barnes could tell whether the cars 
were moving, and he must have been 60 car lengths distant 
from the bin track (R. 170). Later on redirect examination, 
Barnes said that when the cars approached the bin they 
possibly were not moving over 5 or 6 miles per hour ( R. 
193). Barnes didn't "imagine" the cars were going over 4 
miles per hour when they got onto the bin and were passing 
the sign on the bin (located 50 feet from the end of the bin 
as shown by Exhibit A) (R. 194). At that speed, in Barnes' 
opinion, the cars could have been stopped "most any time, 
within a couple of car lengths" (R. 194). Barnes kept 
watching the cars. He could see the cars were still moving 
at a slow rate of speed. He saw the cars hit the incline or 
bumper device at the end of the bin, and the lead end of the 
car raised up very slowly (R. 169). It seemed like this in-
cline broke away and the cars pitched right off the bin into 
the ground. At no time during the period that Barnes 
watched the cars move could he see Thomas (R. 170). He 
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didn't know whether or not Thomas ever applied the brakes 
(R. 175). 
Schauster testified as follows: 
In the regular course of his duties on October 11th, 
Schauster knew that either he or Thomas was going to ride 
the cars to the bin. Nobody specifically told them to do 
this; it was just part of their ordinary duties. They took it 
as a matter of course (R. 2·52). When he and Thomas 
walked toward the two cars, Schauster said to Thomas, 
"Jerry, get the pin and release the hand brake. I will ride 
these cars to the bin" ( R. 243) . Thomas replied, "No, I 
will drop them; you get the pin" (R. 243). Thomas then 
stepped up to the brake platform of the lead car and Schaus-
ter went to the rear of the two cars. Schauster pulled the pin 
between the two bin cars and the other two cars of the cut, 
and then got up on the platform of the end }?rake of the 
second car (R. 244) . Schauster released the brake on his 
end of the second bin car. The two cars continued to stand 
on the grade held by the one brake applied on Thomas' end 
of the lead car. At that time, the brake on the front end of 
the lead car was functioning properly (R. 254). Thomas 
gave Schauster a signal that he was ready to move and 
Barnes also gave a signal. The cars were still standing 
there as Schauster proceeded to get down from the car he 
had been on. Thomas then released the brake on the end 
of the car he was riding, and the cars started to move into 
the bin track ( R. 244) . 
Schauster and Barnes next took the two remaining cars 
down to the storage track ( R. 244) . As they were dropping 
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these two cars, Barnes remarked to Schauster, "I believe 
he is going a little fast" (R. 245). When Schauster looked 
in the direction of the bin track, he saw the two cars ap-
proaching the bin. The cars were four or five car lengths 
north of the bin (R. 245). At that time, Schauster would 
estimate the speed of the cars at 7 or 8 miles per hour (R. 
246, 2'5:5). When Schauster previously had discussed th~ 
matter with defendant's counsel, he had estimated the speed 
at this particular point at 8 to 10 miles per hour, perhaps 
faster.' But he didn't know exactly the speed (R. 257-258). 
He merely estimated the approximate speed from his posi-
tion one-half mile away from the cars (R. 250). Schauster 
continued to watch the cars. They appeared to be slowing 
as they went by a stationary white sign located at the ap-
proach to the trestle of the bin. At that point, Schauster 
would estimate the speed of the cars at 3 to 4 or possibly 
5 miles per hour. The cars moved past a second sign which 
read "Cars Must Not Pass This Point," and went on over 
the end of the bin (R. 246). Schauster could not see Thomas 
on the cars. He didn't know what, if anything, Thomas did 
about the brakes (R. 258). 
After the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defen-
dant called three witnesses. The first two of these witnesses, 
Silas A. Ross, Jr. and Arnett W. Dodds, were employees 
of the Utah Fuel Co. Both of these men saw the cars moving 
down the bin track and made observations regarding the 
speed of the cars and of other details incident to the move-
ments of Thomas on the cars. Both witnesses were much 
closer to the moving cars than either Barnes or Schauster. 
Defendant's third witness, a General Car Foreman by the 
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name of Alfred , George Martin, made a detailed inspection 
of the cars, car brakes and tracks involved shortly after 
the accident. 
Ross testified as follows: 
Ross worked as a chemist at the coke ovens (R. 2~88). 
He was an eye witness to the occurrences leading to the 
accident and death of Gerald D. Thomas, and was attending 
court under a subpoena issued by the plaintiff. He had 
been sitting in the hallway of the courthouse for several 
days, but had not been asked to testify (R. 288). On October 
11, 1947, at about 11 :00 o'clock in the morning, Ross was 
in the scale house. The scale house is marked on the map, 
Exhibit A, and is located 17'5 ·feet south of the south end 
of the bin according to the scale of the map. The scale house 
has a sort of bay window effect right in front. Ross was 
keeping a close lookout from the window to see when the 
coal for the bin would arrive (R. 290). He first saw the 
two coal cars just after _they left the switch leading from the 
load track to the bin track (R. 290), at a point marked 
"R-1" on the map (R. 292). Ross noticed the cars first 
through the bay window, then he stepped to the doorway 
of the scale house (R. 2~90). The doorway faces the bin 
(R. 2;98). He next saw the cars about 800 feet further 
along the bin track at a point marked "R-2" on the map 
(R. 292). As shown by Exhibit A, point "·R,.2" is past the 
comparatively steep grade of the bin track and is where 
the grade of the track is comparatively level. Ross esti-
mated the speed of the cars at "R-2" at between 25 and 35 
miles per hour (R. 291). Ross next saw the cars at the 
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point marked "R-3" on the map, which is a point approxi-
mately 750 feet beyond "R-2". Ross estimated the 
speed of the cars at "R-3" at 18 to 22 or 2,5 miles per hour 
(R. 292). Ross next sa-w the cars as they entered the trestle 
approach to the bin at a point marked "R-4" on the map 
(R. 292), and at that point the cars were moving at a speed 
of from 12 to 15 miles per hour (R. 296). 
At this latter point, "R-4", Ross first noticed the brake-
man, Thomas, on the head end of the two cars (R. 29'3'). 
Thomas hadn't applied· any brake, or anything (R,. 293). 
Thomas was standing on the brake platform but was not 
doing anything to the brakes ( R. 293). Thomas stood on 
the br~ke platform, with his hand on the brake wheel in the 
prescribed position, his head facing toward the bin in the 
direction the car was moving ( R. 294) . 
When the cars first entered onto the bin, they momen-
tarily passed from Ross' view (R. 294), but next came into 
view after they had passed the sign on the bin marked with 
the inscription "Danger. Cars Not To Be Dropped Beyond 
This Point" (R. 295). (As shown by Exhibit A~ this sign 
is located 50 feet from the end of the bin.) As the cars 
passed the "danger" sign, Ross saw Thomas standing on 
the brake platform leaning over the brake wheel (R. 29·5, 
306), but Thomas was not working the brake when the cars 
first came into view at this point ( R. 306) . Thomas then 
glanced over his shoulder at the danger sign, and "after he 
passed the danger point, he applied the brake" (R. 295, 
307). At that time, th~ cars were traveling at an estimated 
speed of 8 to 12 miles per hour (R. 297). It appeared to Ross 
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as though Thomas stepped down on the coupling of the car, 
in order to get clear of the cars (R. 295). Ross saw the cars 
for the last time after they had passed the "danger" sign. 
They seemed to stay at the same speed of 8 to 12 miles per 
hour ( R. 297) . He did not actually see the cars go over the 
end of the bin. There were high tension electric lines around 
and Ross protected himself by leaving the vicinity of the 
scale house just before the cars went over the end of the 
bin (R. 296). 
Dodds testified as follows: 
Dodds was Superintendent of ,coke operations for the 
Utah Fuel Company (R. 310). At about 11 o'clock in the 
morning on October 11, 1947, Dodds was returning to the 
coke ovens from the Company office in Sunnyside. Dodds 
was driving his automobile, accompanied by his assi~tant, 
Mr. Hernberg. Dodds turned off the main highway into 
a road leading to the bin and coke ovens. As Dodds turned 
into the roadway, he saw two loaded coal cars just coming 
off the main line track into the bin track (R .. 312). Dodds 
and Hernberg noticed that the two cars were traveling at 
an unusually high rate of speed. They spoke to each other 
about the fact (R. 313). When Dodds saw the cars and 
make the remark about there unusual speed, the automobile 
Dodds was driving was traveling at a full 25 miles per hour 
(R. 314, 315) in a direction approximately parallel with 
the bin track. In going back and forth on that particular 
roadway, Dodds has observed the speed of his automobile 
many times. ·He -therefore judged the speed of the coal cars 
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by the speed of his automobile (R. 314). The cars on the 
bin track were going faster than his automobile. 
The cars momentarily passed out of view and Dodds 
next saw the cars at a point on the bin track marked "D-4" 
on Exhibit A, a point about 1800 feet north of the approach 
to the bin as scaled on the map (R. 315). Dodds' automo-
bile was then at a point on the roadway marked "D-3,': on 
Exhibit A, which point was roughly parallel with the cars 
on the bin track and about 3,25 feet distant (R. 316). The 
cars on the bin track were still traveling at a speed in ex-
cess of 25 miles per hour (R. 317). It would be Dodds' judg-
ment when he observed them, that the cars were traveling 
at a speed of aroun_d 30 miles per hour (R. 320). Dodds 
could see Thomas standing on the brake platform of the 
lead car. Thomas' face was towards the bin. He was not 
doing anything with reference to the brakes. He was just 
riding along, holding onto the brake wheel (R. 319). 
Martin testified as follows: 
Martin was employed by the defendant as General Gar 
Foreman of the Grand Junction Division (R. 330). He was 
familiar with the Ajax brake, its parts, and the manner in 
which it operates (R. 331). He examined the cars that had 
fallen over the bin at about 7:30 P. M. on the evening of 
the day of the accident ( R. 335) . He inspected both cars 
as soon as he arrived at the scene. This inspection was 
made before anything was done to remove the cars or repair 
the bin (R. 336). With respect to the first car that went 
off the bin, No. 71619, Martin inspected the brake equip-
ment with the aid of a powerful beam light. That night he 
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inspected all parts of the brake on this car, excepting the 
parts that were burie~ under the coal (R. 3·3.6). The brake 
mechanism was partly in place (R. 337). No part of the 
brake rigging was torn up or destroyed. The parts that 
connect the brake rigging with the brake shoes were still 
intact. The trucks of the wheels were disengaged from the 
body of the car. No parts of the brake were broken or miss-
ing (R. 338). Of course he was not able to make any func-
tional test of the brakes (R. 342·). The following morning 
at 9:00A.M., Martin had the section men take the coal away 
from the front end of the car. He inspected the Ajax braker 
the brake housing and brake wheel on the lead end of the first 
car, and they were absolutely okey. He did not find any 
defect or imperfection whatsoever in any of the brake mech-
anism (R. 338). 
Martin also observed the wheels of the first car that 
went over the bin. He did not observe any flat places or 
spots on these wheels, nor any indication that the wheels of 
the car had slid at any time (R. 340). If the wheels had slid, 
Martin would have been able to determine that fact from 
his examination .. No flat spots were observed (R. 340). 
There was no indication on the brake shoes that the brakes 
had been applied with sufficient force to. slide the car 
wheels (R. 341). 
It is not true that if a car is in motion and the car can't 
be stopped by the use of the brake, that there is necessarily 
something wrong with the brake. With the power hand 
brake, you can stop the car, providing you don't get the 
car above a certain speed ( R. 342) . If the brakes are op-
erated properly, the car would stop. If the car doesn't stop, 
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then the car is going too fast ( R. 345) . There was absolutely 
nothing wrong with the brakes on the car that went over 
the.bin. The brakes were okey, and complied with the ICC 
regulations, the Association regulations, and there was noth-
ing broken on the car itself (R. 348). The brake on this 
particular car was in the shop and inspected on September 
17th (R. 346). 
Evidence 're alleged absence of bumper device and haz-
ardous construction of the bin. 
There was little evidence with respect to the subject of 
a bumper device on the bin or the nature of the construction 
of the bin. The only witnesses whose testimony touched 
upon these matters w_ere C. W. Robinson, the civil engineer 
who prepared Exhibit A and testified on behalf of the plain-
tiff, and the defense witness, Arnett W. Dodds. All of their 
testimony on these subjects is herein set forth: 
A scale drawing showing a side view of the bin and 
of the bumper device constructed at the end of the bin is 
illustrated on plaintiff's Exhibit A. This Exhibit A also 
shows a cross section of the south end of the bin, on a scale 
of one inch equals six feet. Exhibit A was adopted and 
introduced in evidence by the plaintiff. As indicated by Ex-
hibit A, the bumper device constructed at the end of the bin 
was elevated above the level of the track at about a 30° angle. 
It was braced by 12" by 12" timbers. The tracks along the 
top of the bin were curved up and into a point on the bumper 
device. 
The witness C. W. Robinson was employed by the de-
fendant as assistant engineer in the Office of the Division 
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Engineer at Grand Junction, Colorado. He was a civil en-
gineer '(R. 115), and the map, Exhibit A, was drawn to 
scale as accurately as possible (R. 166, 117). The slack coal 
bin itself is 198 feet long (R. 123). The trestle approaching 
the bin is 43.6 feet long (R. 123). The bin is what might 
be called a great big box. The total height of the bin is 
34 feet from the ground to the base of the rails on the top 
of the bin (R. 123). About 1'6 feet of this height consists of 
the upper part of the bin into which the coal is dumped 
( R. 123), and which is lined on each side with 2 inch mater-
ial. The bottom part of the bin is an open trestle composed 
of 12" by 12" posts, 12" by 12" caps, and .3>'' by 12" braces. 
The vents or underpinnings of the bin are at 6 foot inter-
vals (R. 124). 
In describing the construction of the bumper device, 
Robinson testified that there were four 12" by 12" postS 
going up to a 14" by 14" stringer. Above that stringer were 
two 12" by 12" laid horizontally at right angles to the track. 
On top of that were 9" by 18" stringers resting on top of the 
two 12"by12"s at the top and end cap of the bin. On top of 
that were standard gauge cross ties and rails which ran up 
_and tapered to a point which came in as well as up, instead 
of maintaining a standard gauge width. The elevation of 
the tapered rails was approximately four feet above the 
base of the rail on the surface of the bin (R. 135). 
During the testimony of Robinson, the plaintiff intro-
duced in evidence several photographs marked for identifi-
cation as Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, H, and I. These photo-
graphs were taken after the accident and showed the bin 
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in its damaged condition. Defendant objected to the intro-
duction of these exhibits as immaterial because they illus-
trated the condition of the bin after the accident, but the 
objection was overruled. Robinson testified that the con-
dition of the bin before the accident was different from 
that depicted in these photographs (R. 125). In the accident, 
the bumper device at the end of the bin was destroyed (R. 
134). Moreover, the end of the bin structure as shown in 
the photographs was opened and damaged as a result of 
the accident (R. 137). Before the accident, the bin was 
approximately 18 feet longer than shown by the photographs 
(R. 139). 
The witness Dodds saw the bin immediately after the 
cars had gone over the end of it. The structure of the bin 
was not greatly damaged at that time (R. 32.9). The sides of 
the bin were not torn down. There was no evidence of col-· 
lapse of the bin at all. The cars didn't go into the bin and 
slop out over the ground. The rails that were left on top of 
the bin were torn off. They were not bent down, but ripped 
completely off (R. 329). Later, a bulldozer appeared on 
the scene and hitched onto the cars with cables and pulled 
~. them clear. When this was done, the side braces at the 
~ south end of the bin were torn off ( R. 3-29) . The siding and 
uprights were ripped off by the bulldozer (R. 330). 
STATEME:NT OF ERRORS 
1. The trial court erred in submitting to the jury the 
: ff issue of whether the defendant had violated the Safety Ap-
pliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11, since there was insuf-
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ficient evidence to justify submission of this issue, and the 
trial court should have granted defendant's request for a 
peremptory instruction with respect to this issue. [See 
Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the trial court (R. 65-
7 5) , and defendants requested Instruction No. 2 ( R. 4 7) . ] 
2 .. The trial court erred in submitting to the jury the 
issue of whether the defendant was guilty of negligence 
with respect to the issues of ( 1) alleged absence of bumper 
timbers or a bumper device at the end of the bin, and (2) 
alleged hazardous construction of the bin, since there was 
insufficient evidence to justify submission of these issues, 
and the trial court should have granted defendant's request 
for a peremptory instruction with respect to these issues. 
[See Instruction No. 1 of the trial court (R. 65-68) and 
defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 (R. 46).] 
. 3. The 'trial court erred in instructing the jury in its 
Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 with respect to the claimed 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, for the reason that 
said instructions were repetitious, placed undue emphasis on 
plaintiff's theory of the case, unbalanced the whole of the 
charge to the jury, were misleading and inaccurate as state-
ments of law, and were improper because of the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. 
4. The trial court erred in prejudicially instructing 
the jury in its Instructions Nos. 7 and 8, for the reasons that 
said instructions gave the jury a roving commission to find 
the defendant guilty of negligence without reference to the 
specific charges set forth in plaintiff's complaint or the 
evidence submitted, also the instructions were abstract 
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statements of the law which tended only to confuse and 
mislead the jury. 
5. The trial court erred in determining as a matter of 
law that at the time of the accident and death of the de-
ceased, both the defendant and deceased were engaged in 
interstate commerce, since on the basis of the evidence this 
jurisdictional issue of fact should have been submitted to 
the jury. [See Instructions Nos. 4 and 6 of the trial court.] 
6. The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion 
to strike and sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's 
· plea of set-off ( R. 369), since the set-off claimed by the de-
fendant was expressly authorized by statute, 45 U. S. C. A. 
Sec. 55. 
7. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in 
failing to order a new trial or order a remittitur of a portion 
of the verdict, in view of the fact that the amount of the 
verdict was grossly excessive, contrary to the evidence, and 
the result of misund~rstanding, bias, and prejudice on the 
part of the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY VIOLATION OF 
THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT AND THE TRIAL 
COUR'T ERRED IN SUBMITTING SUCH ISSUE AND 
IN REFUSING TO WITHDRAW IT FROM CONSIDER-
ATION OF THE JURY. 
Among the several issues which the trial court sub-
mitted to the jury in this case was the issue of whether there 
had been a violation by the defendant of the Safety Ap-
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pliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11. This particular issue 
was submitted to the jury by the trial court's Instruction 
No. 1, Instruction No. 2, Instruction No. 4, Instruction No. 
5 and Instruction No. 6 (R. 65-6H, 71-76). A peremptory 
instruction was requested by the defendant, removing this 
issue from the consideration of the jury, but was refused by 
the trial court (R.. 47). The defendant also sought to elim-
inate consideration of this issue, by means of a request 
contained in paragraph two of its motion for directed 
verdict ( R. 30), but the trial court also denied this 
motion in its entirety (R. 354). Furthermore, the propriety 
of submitting this issue to the jury was argued at length 
at the hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, which 
motion likewise was denied (R. 370-372.). Appropriate 
exceptions were taken to the trial court's several rulings 
with respect to this issue ( R. 354, 35,6-359). 
Since the verdict rendered by the jury was general, it 
very well may be that the jury arrived at its decision by 
determining this particular issue against the defendant. · 
The likelihood of this is indicated by the failure of the jury 
to make any deduction from the verdict on account of the 
contributory negligence of the deceased, even though there 
was cogent evidence from Which it could have been deter-
mined that negligence on the part of the deceased materially 
contributed to the accident resulting in his death. Moreover, 
counsel for plaintiff dwelled at length on the alleged viola-
tion of the Safety Appliance Act in his argument to the 
jury, and the issue was pointedly emphasized by the trial 
court in at least five repetitive instructions (R. 65-69, 71-
75). 
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In the language of,the trial court's Instruction No. 1, 
the particular issue submitted to the jury under the Safety 
Appliance Act was whether or not the defendant "hauled 
and permitted to be used and hauled on its tracks a car not 
equipped with a sufficient hand brake, to wit: the leading 
car of the two cars loaded with coal, thereby making it im-
possible for decedent, by the use of said brake, in the usual 
and ordinary manner, to retard or control the speed of said 
cars or to bring them to a stop on the trestle" ( R. 67) . 
Under the law, as enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Myers v. Reading Company, 3-31 U. S. 
477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, there are two recognized methods of 
showing the inefficiency of hand brake equipment in order 
to establish a case under the Safety Appliance Act, to-wit: 
(1) "evidence may be adduced to establish some particular 
defect;" or, (2i) "the same inefficiency may be established by 
showing a failure to function, when operated with due care, 
in the normal, natural, and usual manner." See Didinger 
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Compa,ny, 39 F. (2d) 798, 79'9, 
as quoted with approval in Myers v. Reading Company, 
supra. 
With respect to the first method of proving a violation 
of the Safety Appliance Act, there is not a scintilla of evi-
dence tending to prove any particular defect in the hand-
brake equipment of the car involved in this accident. Not 
only is there no evidence of a particular defect, but there 
is affirmative and uncontradicted evidence that no such 
defect existed. The witness Martin made a thorough inspec-
tion of the braking equipment shortly after the accident and 
found it to be in good mechanical condition throughout with 
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no parts either broken or missing, except for some damage 
caused by the cars falling from the bin (R. 338). The tes-
timony of this witness is uncontradict~d in any particular. 
The defendant is confident that no claim will be made by 
the plaintiff that there is any evidence in this record tending 
to establish any particular defect in the braking equipment. 
It follows that unless there is substantial evidence tend-
ing to prove that the deceased operated the braking equip-
ment with due care in the normal, natural and usual manner 
and that it failed to function when so operated, no issue 
involving the Safety Appliance Act is presented. 
It is respectfully submitted that a review of all the 
evidence in the case at bar, demonstrates a complete failure 
of proof with respect to this issue. To the contrary, the 
evidence establishes that the deceased did not apply the 
hand brake of the car on which he was riding until the car 
was less than 50 feet from the end of the coal bin structure, 
that is, until the car had passed the sign onthe bin located 
50 feet from the south end of the bin. Under no circum-
stances indicated by the evidence could the cars have been 
stopped or prevented from passing over the end of the bin, 
by operation of the hand brake at this point. 
Only three witnesses testifieq at the trial who had some 
knowledge of the circumstances immediately preceding the 
accident, namely, Barnes, Schauster and Ross. Barnes and 
Schauster were both more than a half mile distant. From 
that distance, Barnes said that he could not be sure of the 
speed of the cars ( R. 17~). He first saw the two coal cars 
being ridden by the deceased when they were 400 to 600 
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feet from the bin (~. 169). At that time, Barnes made the 
remark to Schauster that the cars were "going too fast", 
and he estimated their speed at from 8 to 10 miles per hour 
(R. 169). On redirect examination, Barnes said that when 
the cars approached the bin he would estimate they were 
moving about 5 or 6 miles per hour (R. 193). He didn't 
"imagine" that the cars were going over. 4 miles per hour 
when they got onto the bin and as they were passing the 
sign (R. 194). At that speed ·and with an Ajax brake in 
good working order, Barnes was of the opinion that the 
cars could have been stopped within "a couple of car lengths". 
(R. 194) . Since a car length is about 50 feet ( R. 173), it 
would have been impossible even under Barnes' testimony, 
to have stopped the cars within the 50-foot space remaining 
between the sign on the bin marked "Cars Must Not Pass 
This Point" and the end of the bin. Interpreting "a couple 
of car lengths" as at least two car lengths, would mean that· 
in Barnes' opinion the cars when traveling at 4 miles per 
hour would have required a stopping distance of at least 
100 feet. Barnes' statement that the cars were gradually 
slowing from a point 400 to 600 feet from the bin structure 
would naturally be the case regardless of any application 
of the brakes, since as shown by the plaintiff's Exhibit A, 
the grade of the bin track gradually slackens and on the 
bin itself and for some distance before reaching the bin is1 
practically level (R. 121). Barnes of course did not and 
could not see the deceased, Thomas, at· any time during the 
movement of the cars down the bin track, and therefore could 
not say whether Thomas ever applied or operated the brake 
(R. 17 4, 175). So that Barnes' hypothesis with respect to 
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stopping distance is really immaterial in any event, in the 
absence of evidence that the deceased ever made any applica-
tion of the hand brake at any of the points on the bin track 
where the cars were seen by Barnes. The testimony of 
Schauster adds nothing to that of Barnes. 
The testimony of Ross is of signifance, since he was the 
closest eye witness to the events connected with the accident. 
This witness held a responsible position with the Utah Fuel 
Company (R. 288). He had been subpoenaed by the plain-
. tiff, but for reasons which become obvious in the light of 
his testimony was not put on the witness stand by plain-
tiff (R. 288). Ross stated that he watched the movement 
of the coal cars down the bin track from the doorway of 
the scale house (R. 290) ,. located according to Exhibit A 
about 17 5 feet from the south end of the bin structure. 
as the cars entered the approach to the trestle leading to 
the bin, that is, the position marked "R-4" on Exhibit A, 
the cars were moving at a speed of from 12 to 15 miles 
per hour (R.. 2-92, 293). At that point Ross first noticed 
Thomas standing on the end of the lead car on the brake 
platform. At that time, Thomas hadn't applied any brake 
( R. 293) . He was facing toward the bin in the direction 
in which the cars were moving (R. 294). He was not doing · 
anything to the brakes (R. 293). The cars then momentarily 
passed out of Ross' vision and he next saw them as they 
passed the sign on the bin structure marked with the inscrip-
tion "Danger. Cars Must Not Be Dropped Beyond This 
Point" (R. 294, 295). At that time Thomas was standing 
on the brake platform and was bent over the brake wheel, 
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but he 'Was not doing anything to the brake when he first 
came into view (R. 29·5). Ross then saw Thomas glance 
over his shoulder at the "danger" sign, and "after he passed 
the danger point, he applied the brake" (R. 295). This is 
the only evidence in the record of any application of the 
brake at any time by Thomas during his entire trip down 
the bin track. At the time the brakes were applied for the 
first time, the cars were moving according to Ross at an 
estimated speed of from 8 to 12 miles per hour, and con-
tinued at that same relative speed so long as he observed 
them (R. 2.96). Ross ceased his observation just before 
the cars passed over the end of the bin structure ( R. 296) . 
It thus will be seen that the only evidence in the case 
of the application of the hand brake at any time by Thomas 
was at a time after the car he was riding had passed the 
second sign on the bin structure, that is, when the lead car 
was less than 50 feet from the end of the bin. Obviously an 
application of the brake at that late moment would have 
afforded no opportunity for bringing the cars to a stop. In 
this connection, consideration should be given to the testi:-
mony of both Barnes and Schauster to the effect that the 
brake on the car was fully operative and in good working 
order at the time the cars began their movement down the 
bin track (R. 181, 254), also to the testimony of Car Fore-
man Martin to the effect that he made a detailed examina-
tion of the brake, the brake rigging and all pertinent equip-
ment shortly after the accident and found nothing defective 
or insufficient and found no brake parts broken or missing 
(R. 338). 
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Where then is the necessary evidence that the brake 
failed to function, "when operated with due care, in the 
normal, natural and usual manner"? Obviously there is 
none. The brake was-never operated in any manner what-
soever until the cars involved were less· than 50 feet from 
the end of the bin structure. It was then too late for a brake 
functioning perfectly to stop the cars. 
Plaintiff doubtless will urge that from the above evi-
dence, it should be inferred : ( 1) that timely application 
of the brake was made by the deceased; (2) that the brake 
when applied was operated .with due care in the normal, 
natural and usual manner; (3) that when so operated, 
the brake failed to function ;-and then from this series 
of inferences urge the further inference ( 4) that the brake 
was defective-thereby creating an issue for the jury with 
respect to the alleged violation of the Safety Appliance 
Act. Any verdict based upon such an unwarranted proposi-
tion, involving as it does the piling of inference upon in-
ference, has been repeatedly condemned by all the courts 
,of the land. The United States Supreme Court has ex-
,pressly rejected such a proposition in numerous decisions. 
Typical cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
are Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, 
53 S. Ct. 391 and Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 
27fU. S. 472, 46 S. Ct. 564, 5166. 
In the Chamberlain case, supra, an action was brought 
to recover for the death of a brakeman alleged to have been~ 
caused by the negligence of the defendant below. The plain-
tiff claimed that the deceased fell from a string of cars 
which he was riding from the top of a "hump". The string 
of cars descended the hump by the force of gravity. The 
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string of cars ridden by the deceased was preceded by an-
other string of cars a short distance ahead, and was followed 
by still a third string of cars. The plaintiff's contention was 
that the third string of cars violently collided from behind 
with the string of cars on which the deceased was riding, 
causing the deceased to fall to the ground and be run over 
by a car or cars. The only testimony produced by the plain-
tiff to support his contention was a witness Bainbridge who 
stated that he heard a "loud crash" after the three separate 
strings of cars had passed him. Shortly thereafter, Bain-
bridge looked up the track and saw ~he second and third 
strings of cars moving together and the deceased no longer 
in sight. From this testimony, the plaintiff argued that a 
jury issue was created in that it could be inferred that the 
two strings of cars were negligently allowed to collide and 
that the deceased fell and was killed as a result of the colli-
sion. But the Supreme Court held, speaking through Mr. 
Justice Sutherland, that this would amount to piling infer-
ence upon inference and would not be justified under the 
law, that the case should not be submitted to a jury. The 
. Court said : 
"* * * There is no direct evidence that in 
fact the crash was occasioned by a collision of ·the 
two strings in question; and it is perfectly clear that 
no such fact was brought to Bainbridge's attention 
as a perception of the physical sense of sight or of 
hearing. At most there was an inference to that 
effect drawn from observed facts which gave equal 
support to the opposite inference that the crash was 
occasioned by the coming together of other strings of 
ears entirely away from the scene of the ·accident, or 
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of the two-car string ridden by deceased and the 
seven-·car string immediately ahead of it. 
"We, therefore, have a case belonging to that 
class of cases where proven facts give equal support 
to each of two inconsistent inferences ; in which 
event, neither of them being established, judgment, 
as a matter of law, must go against the party upon 
whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these 
inferences as against the other, before he is entitled 
to recover. 
* * * 
"And the desired inference is precluded for the 
further reason that respondent's right of recovery 
depends upon the existence of a particular fact which 
must be inferred from proven facts, and this is not 
permissible in the face of the positiv~ and otherwise 
uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses 
consistent with the facts actually proved, from which 
testimony it affirmatively appears that the fact 
sought to be inferred did not exist * * *" 
Again in the Coogan case, supra, under similar circum-
stances, the Court said : 
"* * * As there is no direct evidence, it is 
necessary to determine whether the circumstances are 
sufficient to warrant a finding of fact. Whenever 
circumstantial evidence is relied on to prove a fact, 
the circumstances must be proved and not themselves 
presumed." 
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence 
that Thomas ever made timely application of the brake on 
the car he was riding, with due care, in the normal, natural, 
and usual manner, and that the brake when then thus applied 
failed to function. It not only would be speculation and con-
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dence to infer from still other inferences that any such 
application of the brake was made. Such unfounded specu-
lation and conjecture as a basis for a verdict is contrary to 
law. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, supra. In Grand 
Trunk WesternR. Co. v. Holstein, 67 F. (2d) 780 (C.C.A. 6), 
a safety appliance defect case, it was said "No jury should 
be permitted to draw a conclusion from the evidence when 
the proper conclusion to be drawn lies wholly within the 
realm of speculation and conjecture." Neither can it be 
presumed that Thomas made timely application of the brakes 
in the normal manner, as part of any presumption of due 
care on his part. This would be tantamount to drawing an 
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, from , 
a presumption of care on the part of the deceased. Such 
illogic has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Looney 
v. Metropolitan Railroad Co., 200 U. S. 480, 488, 2,6 S. Ct. 
303, in the following language : 
"* * * the negligence of a defendant cannot 
be inferred from a presumption of care on the part 
of the person killed. A presumption in the perform-
ance of duty attends the defendant as well as the 
person killed. It must be overcome by direct evidence. 
One presumption cannot be built upon another." 
It is submitted that under the law and the evidence as 
above set forth, the trial court erred in failing to remove 
this issue of an alleged violation of the Safety Appliance 
Act from the jury's consideration. The evidence was 
clearly insufficient to support a verdict based upon such 
an issue. By the uniform holdings of this Court, the 
failure to limit the jury in its deliberation, to consideration 
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only of those charged acts of negligence which are sus-
tained and supported by proof, constitutes prejudicial error. 
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46 Utah 502, 151 
Pac. 53; Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 25·6, 9 P. (2d) 183; 
Industrial Comm. v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80 Utah 223, 14 
P. (2d) 988; Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. (2d) 
12. Since the verdict rendered in the present case was gen-
eral and no one can tell whether or not the jury found for 
the plaintiff upon the unproved issue improperly submitted 
to it, the case should be reversed for a new trial. Schilling 
v. Delaware & H. R. Corporation, 114 F. (2d) 69, 72, (C. 
C. A. 2) ; Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., supra. 
II. 
THER,E WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENlCE TO 
JUS:TlFY SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUES 
OF ALLEGgD ABSENCE OF A BUMPER DEVICE AND 
AULEGED HAZARDOUS CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
BIN. 
The trial court committed further error in submitting 
to the jury the issues of: (1) alleged absence of bumper 
timbers or bumper device at the end of the bin, and (2) 
alleged hazardous construction of the bin ( R. 67), 
together with the further issue of (3·) whether either of 
these alleged conditions contributed to the accident result-
ing in the death of the deceased (R. 66). The allegationg 
with respect to issues (1) an~ (2) were set forth as sepa-
rate counts of negligence in plaintiff's complaint (R. 4-5). 
The issues will be disc~ssed together. It should be borne 
in mind, however, that under the general verdict returned 
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by the jury, either one or all of the issues may have been 
resolved ag·ainst the defendant, and if the evidence is. insuf-
ficient with respect to any one of the issues, the defendant 
would be entitled to a new trial. A peremptory instruction 
was requested by .the defendant, removing each and all of 
the foregoing issues from consideration of the jury (R. 46). 
But the trial court refused the defendant's request (R. 46,) 
and proceeded to submit the issues to the jury by its Instruc-
tion No.1 (R. 67). No other or qualifying instructions with 
respect to these issues were requested by the plaintiff or 
given by the court. 
It is submitted that the record in this case reveals a 
complete absence of any evidence to support the above alle-
gations, or of any evidence that such alleged negligence in 
any manner proximately contributed to the accident forming 
the basis of this lawsuit. On the contrary the record af-
firmatively contradicts such allegations. 
The scale map introduced in evidence as the plaintiff's 
Exhibit A, prepared by the defendant's engineering de-
partment, but adopted by plaintiff as his own exhibit (R. 
116, 350), shows a detailed diagram of the trestle, the 
bin and of the bumper device constructed at the end of 
the bin. This scale map was introduced in evidence by 
the plaintiff, without reservation, and was identified as 
an accurate drawing of the bin structure and appurtenances. 
(R. 116-117). C. W. Robinso~, the civil engineer who pre-
pared the map, was called as a witness by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is of course bound by his testimony. Robinson 
described the bumper device as follows (R. 135) : 
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"Q. Calling your attention to your diagram of 
the slack bin here, will you describe a little more 
fully this bumper that was located on the end, what 
the construction of it was? 
"A. Well, it is-there is four 12 by 12 posts go-
ing up here to a 14 by 14 stringer, and above that 
stringer there are two 12 by 12's laid horizontally 
at right angles to the track. On top of that is four 
~ by 18 stringers that rest on the top of these 12 by 
12's at the top and end cap of the bin, and on top of 
that were standard gauge cross ties, and on top of 
that were the rails which run up and tapered to a 
point to come in as well as up, instead of maintain-
ing a standard gauge width. As shown here, they 
tapered in. 
"Q. In other words, the rails were going up to a 
point? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. About what would be the elevation? 
"A. The end of that was approximately four 
feet above the base of the rail of the track of the bin." 
The several photographs of the bin introduced in evi-
dence by the plaintiff, over objection of the defendant, 
show the bin structure in a damaged condition and fail to 
show any bumper device. It was admitted by all the wit-
nesses, hmyever, including plaintiff's counsel, that the photo-
graphs were taken after the accident and illustrate the con-
dition of the bin after the accident and after a bulldozer 
had damaged the structure (R. 125, 130, 132). 
The witness Arnett W. Dodds, stated that he observed 
the bin directly after the accident and that there was "no 
evidence of collapse of the bin at all" (R. 329'). The rails on 
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top of the bin wer~ not bent down, . they were ripped com-
pletely off (R. 329). The bulldozer that rerailed the two 
coal cars tore the side braces off the bin and ripped the 
sidings and end uprights off. Most of the damage to the bin 
was caused by the bulldozer ( R. 330) . 
There were no witnesses who offered any testimony 
with respect to these particular matters excepting Robinson 
and Dodds. What evidence does exist, however, squarely con-
tradicts the plaintiff's allegations of negligence with respect 
to the absence of a bumper device or hazardous construction 
of the bin. It seems superfluous to labor the point that there 
was no evidence to justify the trial court in submitting these 
issues to the jury. In addition to refusing the defendant's 
requested peremptory instruction No. 1, the attention of 
the trial court also was called to the lack of evidence with 
respect to these issues by paragraphs 3 and 4 of defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict (R. 30), which likewise was 
refused (~. 354). Again, the point was argued before the 
trial court on defendant's motion for a new trial, but to no 
avail (R. 370-372). Exceptions were taken to the several 
adverse rulings (R. 356, 354). 
Here there was a complete absence of probative facts to 
support a verdict based upon any one of these particular 
issues of alleged negligence. In the words of the Supreme 
Court in the Myers case, supra : 
"*. * * The requirement is for probative 
facts capable of supporting with reason, the conclu-
sion expressed in the verdiCt. 
"'Petitioner was required to present pro-
bative facts from which the negligence and 
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the causal relation could. reasonably be in-
ferred. "The ess~ntial requirement is that 
mere speculation be not allowed to do duty 
for probative facts, after making due allow-
ance for all reasonably possible inferences 
favoring the party whose case is attacked." 
* * *'" 
Plainly, no heed was given by the trial court in the present 
case to this elementary requirement of "probative facts" 
with respect to the issues above discussed. 
Even if there had been no bumper device at all, there 
is not a scintilla of evidence in this case tending to show 
that the presence or absence of a bumper device or of any 
condition connected with the construction of the bin would 
have made any difference so far as the accident to Thomas 
is concerned. 
Clearly, the trial court committed prejudicial.error in 
failing to limit the consideration of the jury to the particular 
charged acts of negligence sustained and supported by 
substantial evidence. On the contrary, the jury were turned 
loose to find the defendant guilty of any of the acts of 
negligence alleged, regardless of the evidence or lack of 
evidence adduced during the trial. See Peterson v. Sorensen, 
supra, and the other authorities to the same ·effect cited 
under Part I herein. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE TO THE 
JURY A SERIES OF REPETITIOUS INSTRUCT'IONS 
WITH RES1PEGT TO THE SA·FETY APPLIANCE ACT, 
WHJlCH UNDULY E M P H A S I Z E D PLAINTIFF'S 
THEORY OF THE CASE AND UNBALANCED THE 
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ENTIRE CHARGE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE DE-
FENDANT. 
The defendant submits that the trial court prejudicially 
instructed the jury with reference to the alleged issue of a 
violation of the Safety Applianc~ Act. As heretofore pointed 
out, there was insufficient evidence to justify submission of 
this issue in any event. But aside from this, the trial court's 
instructions on this subject were defective in other sub-
stantial particulars. 
In paragraph "B" of its Instruction No. 1, the trial 
court defined and submitted to the jury the issue of a safety 
appliance defect (R. 67). This was done by quoting the 
language of the plaintiff's complaint, notwithstanding this 
court's repeated condemnation of such practice. Fowler v. 
Medical Arts Bldg., . Utah .. , 188 P. (2d) 711 (in which 
case the same trial judge sat as in the case at bar) . Not 
content with having submitted the issue to the jury in the 
confusing language of the complaint, the trial judge pro-
ceeded to read to the jury at least four additional and repe-
titive instruction on t;he same subject, and in nearly consec-
utive order. 
After Instruction No. 1, the court in Instruction No. 2 
told the jury that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove · 
the negligence of the defendant and that such negligence 
"consisted of some one. or more of the acts or omissions al-
leged in the complaint;" but then added, "or that the lead 
car upon which deceased was riding at the time of the fatal 
accident did not have a sufficient hand brake to retard or 
control said cars in the usual and ordinary use, ftnd that 
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such insufficiency, if any, was the proximate cause of the 
fatal injury; and second, the amount of the damage result-
ing therefrom;" (R. 69). To say the least, this was an ex-
tremely confusing and loose statement of the law with re-
spect to the manner of finding a violation of the Safety 
Appliance Act on the basis of a functional failur~ of a brake, 
in the light of the precise definition of the Myers case, supra. 
Again, in paragraph 4 of Instruction No. 4, the trial 
court quoted the statute setting forth the pertinent provi-
sions of the Safety Appliance Act and its requirement with 
respect to efficient hand brakes (R. 71). In paragraph 5 
of the same instruction, the court quoted the . provision of 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act which eliminates con-
tributory negligence as a defense to violation of a safety 
appliance enactment (R. 72). In paragraph 6, the jury were 
told that the defendant was a common carrier subject to 
provision of the Safety Appliance Act as quoted (R. 72). In 
paragraph 7, the jury were told in two or three different 
ways that defendant was liable for failure to maintain effi-
cient hand brakes, regardless of how much care it might have 
exercised to inspect, discover or remedy defects ( R. 72). 
In paragraph 8, the requirements of the Safety Appliance 
Act was again repeated in phraseology to the effect that if 
the jury believed the defendant had violated the Act and 
that such violation was a proximate cause of the fatal in-
juries to decedent, then a verdict should be returned for 
the plaintiff (R. 72-73). In paragraph 9, the jury were told 
that if it should be found from the evidence the decedent 
made an application of the brake before the car he was rid-
ing reached the bin and the car could have been stopped "if 
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said brake had reacted efficiently", then this evidence might 
be considered by the jury in determining whether the brakes 
were defective (R. 73). This was another loose statement 
of the law with respect to finding a functional failure of a 
brake under the Safety Appliance Act in view of the Myers 
case; more than that it improperly authorized the jury to 
find that the decedent made an application of the brake on 
the car he was riding before the car reached the bin, when 
there was not a scintilla of evidence upon which any such a 
finding could be based and was in fact contrary to the only 
affirmative evidence on the subject. See Jensen v. Utah Ry. 
Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349, 3158. In paragraph 10, the 
jury were again informed that no conduct of the decedent, 
·lt whether negligent or not in the performance of his duties, 
must be considered in connection with the "foregoing por-
tions of this instruction" (R. 73). Thus the apparent im-
pression was given that it could be infefred that timely 
application of the brake was made by the decedent, with due 
care, in the normal, natural, and usual manner, regardless . 
of any evidence as to the conduct of the deceased with respect 
to application of the brake. In paragraph 11 of the same 
instruction, the jury finally were given the enlightening 
information that the Safety Appliance Act, including the 
portion of the Act here involved, was a statute enacted for 
the safety of employees (R. 73). 
In Instruction No. 5, the jury were advised still an-
other time that a violation of the Safety Appliance Act by 
the defendant would not be excused no matter how much 
care the defendant exercised to discover or remedy defects 
in the hand brake ( R. 7 4) . 
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Again in Instruction No. 6, the trial court continued to 
repeat and emphasize. In paragraph 1, the court determined 
as a matter of law that defendant and decedent were en-
gaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident 
and the plaintiff's cause of action .was "controlled by the 
Federal Statutes hereinabove referred to" (R. 75). In para-
graph 2, the trial court reiterated the proposition that if 
the jury believed the defendant used the car on which de-
cedent was riding, and the car was not equipped as provided 
by the applicable section of the statute, then defendant could 
be found to have violated "the said Federal Statutes", and 
that if such violation were a proximate cause of the "fatal 
injuries sustained by plaintiff" [sic], then the jury should 
disregard all evidence pertaini~g to the decedent's conduct 
and find for the plaintiff and award damages (R. 75). One 
of the several vices of this instruction, aside from its repeti-
\ 
tious nature, is that in one paragraph it is determined as a 
mat~er of law that the plaintiff's cause of action is controlled 
by "Federal Statutes" apparently indicating the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act as well as the Safety ·Appliance 
Act, and in the next paragraph a safety appliance defect 
is spoken of as a violation of "said Federal Statutes" and i] 
in connection therewith the jury is informed that decedent's :~ 
conduct should be entirely disregarded. The impression iJ 
given is that decedent's conduct also should be disregarded ~~~ 
in connection with the --Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
since it is one of ''said Federal Statutes". 
This· constant hammering repetition and undue empha-
sis, coupled with misleading and inaccurate statements of 
the law, most certainly would have a telling effect on the 
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mind of the average juror. Not only was the same issue 
submitted in two or three different forms of phraseology, 
but all the pertinent statutes were read verbatim, then re-
peated is non-statutory terms, then applied in hypothetical 
abstractions. Moreover, the decedent's lack of any respon-
sibility for his own actions and the lack of any excusable 
course of conduct on the part of the defendant was repeated 
over and over again. 
Lc Courts have condemned instructions containing such un-
nc fair repetition and undue emphasis in numerous cases. In 
:a. Risinger v. Sullivan (App. Tex.) 161 S. W. 397, an instruc-
~i tion unduly emphasizing and repeating plaintiff's theory of 
IT(! the case was held to be reversible error. In Fantroy v. Schir-
lne mer .(App. Mo.) 29'6 S. W. 235, 238, the court condemned 
~· on the ground of undue emphasis three separate instructions 
~~ to the effect that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to 
~ establish the facts. Another instance of undue emphasis 
m1 was involved in City of Lake Forest v. Janowitz, 295 Ill. App. 
mce I 289, 14 N. E. (2d) 894, 896, where it was held error for the 
ia't court to give several substantially similar instructions re-
a!lll lating to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Ana 
~~; i~ O'Hara v. Central Illinois Light Co., 319 Ill. App. 336, 4·9 
i:,:r N. E. (2d) 274, 278, four repetitive instructions on the 
~! issue of damages was held to constitute error. See also 
.\r. Carruthers v. Atlantic & Y. Ry. Co., 215 N. C. 675, 2· S. E. 
(2d) 878, 879, for another example of undue emphasis 
amounting to an expression of opinion on the part of the 
~~ trial court. ~~~I 
~~~ 
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Defendant excepted to the foregoing instructions of the 
trial court upon the specific ground that the instructions as 
given placed undue emphasis upon the plaintiff's case and 
that the charge as a whole was unbalanced (R. 356). Defen-
dant also excepted separately to each of the instruction~ 
above referred to (R. 356-359). Even if it were assumed 
contrary to the fact, that there existed substantial evidence 
of a violation of the Safety Appliance Act on the part of 
the defendant, the instructions of the trial court as given 
were patently biased, unbalanced, and unfairly repetitious. 
The defendant's liability under the Safety Appliance Act, 
and the decedent's lack of any responsibility for his conduct 
figuratively were tossed back and forth all over the court 
room, time and time again. It is interesting to note that the 
trial court granted and gave without modification, each and 
all of the eight instructions requested by the plaintiff (R. 
35-44). The trial court marked refused four separate in-
structions requested by the defendant, and modified three 
other requested instructions to such an extent that the in-
structions as given amounted to refusals (R. 46-49, 51-53, 
5·6). No fair-minded person can read the whole charge 
given, without gaining an immediate impression that the 
trial court forgot that there was a defendant in the action 
and considered only the plaintiff's cause as worthy of con-
sideration by the jury. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT' ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED 
T·H~ JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 7 A~D 8, BY 
GIVING THE JURY A ROVING COMMISSION TO 
FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WITH-
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OUT REFERENCE TO THE PARTICULAR ACT'S OF 
NEGLIGENCE CHARGED IN PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT OR ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In its complaint in this case, the plaintiff alleged the 
negligence of the defendant in varidqs particular counts 
(a) to (d) inclusive (R. 4-5). One of these counts denom-
inated "(a)" alleged that the defendant used an unsafe 
method of moving and placing cars on the bin, in this : 'fthat 
in lieu of using. a locomotive to control the speed and momen-
tum of said cars as they were moving downward along the 
track leading to the trestle, defendant cut said cars loose 
and placed them in motion on said track, and required de-
cedent to station himself on the leading or forward end of 
the first of said cars with no means of controlling their 
speed or momentum except the hand brakes, and that said 
hand brakes were wholly insufficient *- * *" (R. 4). 
This was the only allegation in the whole complaint based 
upon any unsafe method of moving cars on the coal bin. 
Evidence with respect to this allegation was add~ced by 
both sides. The trial court submitted the issue to the jury 
by paragraph marked "A" of its Instruction N'o. 1, in 
the same language as set forth is plaintiff's complaint (R. 
66). 
In paragraph 1 of Instruction No; 7, however, the trial 
court furt~er told the jury that if an employer's business 
was hazardous, it was the duty of the master to adopt rea-
sonable safe methods of work, and then i~ paragraph 2' of 
the same instruction the court added : 
"You are instructed that if you shall find and 
believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this-
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case that the nature of defendant's business and work 
incident thereto in moving cars loaded with coal over 
the bin track onto the trestle above the bins at Sunny-
side, Utah, was such as to impose upon said defen-
dant the duty to adopt and prescribe a reasonable 
safe method e; methods of performing such work and 
moving and spotting such cars and that the defendant 
failed and neglected to adopt or prescribe such rea-
sonable safe methods and that such failu~e and neglect :ill 
on the part of the defendant proximately caused or 
proximately contributed to the cause of the accident 
which resulted in fatal injuries to Gerald Dallas Jl 
Thomas [sic], then you should find in favor of the :,
1 
plaintiff and ag.ainst the defendant." (R. 76.) 
Again in paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 8, the trial court 
told to the jury : 
"Therefore, if you shall find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the decedent, Gerald Dallas 
Thomas, sustained his injuries while in the course of 
his employment, by reason of the negligence of one 
or more of defendant's employees, while the said em-
ployee or employees were in the course of their em-
ployment, then such negligence is imputed to and 
becomes the negligence of the defendant in this case." 
(R. 77.) 
These instructions were duly excepted to by the defendant, 
b_oth with respect to' the instructions as a whole and with 
respect to each of the above quoted paragraphs thereof (R. 
359, 360). 
The most obvious vice of these instructions is that they 
give to the jury a roving commission to find the defendant 
guilty of any and all negligence which may occur to them, 
without in any way limiting the jury's consideration to the 
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particular acts or omissions charged as negligence in the 
complaint. For example, the complaint specifically charges 
an unsafe method of work, in that, cars were allowed to run 
down the bi:r:t track on their own momentum instead of using 
an engine to control them. But paragraph 2 of Instruction 
7, throws the door wide open for the jury to find the defen-
dant liable for the accident and death of Thomas if the 
defendant failed and neglected to adopt or prescribe reason-
able safe methods in moving and spotting cars, without .ref-
erence to or limitation of the jury to a consideration of the. 
'"' one particular alleged unsafe method described and set forth 
in t~e. complaint. And in paragraph 2 of Instruction 
8, the jury were informed that defendant was responsible 
for the "neligence" of its employees, without any relation-
ship of such negligence to that charged in plaintiff's com-
plaint. In effect, these two instructions advised the jury 
to look and find negligence wherever they might, regardless 
of the pleadings in the ____ case. Instructions of this type have 
been repeatedly condemned by this and other courts. In 
Herring v. Chicago and A. R. Co., 299 Ill. 214, 132 N. E. 792, 
the plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries sustained 
in a collision between an automobile in which he was a pas-
senger and a train operated by the defendant at a -public 
crossing. Plaintiff charged several specific acts of negli-
gence. The defendant denied any negligence and pleaded 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The 
court instructed the jury as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that the law is that 
the negligence of the driver of the automobile cannot 
~~ be imputed to the plaintiff, and if the jury believe 
from the preponderance of the evidence that the 
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plaintiff was injured while in the exercise of due care 
and caution for his own safety at and prior to the 
time of the accident, as alleged in the declaration, or 
some count thereof, through the negligence of the 
defendant, then the jury will find the defendant 
guilty." 
This instruction was held to constitute reversible error, the 
court stating in the course of its opinion: 
"An instruction of this character permits the 
jury to wander afield and return a verdict against 
a defendant for what they might fancy to be an act 
of negligence, though the act so considered by them to 
be negligent was one which the law would not recog-
nize as actionable.· In a case where the evidence is as 
· conflicting as it is in this case, the fact that the law 
may be correctly stated in other instructions will not 
obviate the error committed in giving a bad instruc-
tion. In view of the record in this case we must hold 
that the giving of this instruction was reversible 
error." 
Grifenhan v. Chicago Railways Company, 299 Ill. 590, 
132 N. E. 790, involved a collision between an automobile in 
which the plaintiff was riding as a passenger and a railway 
bus operated by the defendant. The plaintiff charged spe-
cific acts of negligence and the defendant asserted that the 
negligence of the dri{rer of the car in which the plaintiff was 
riding was the cause of the injury. The jury were instructed 
as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that, if the negligence 
of two parties proximately contribute~ to cause an 
accident through which a third party is injured, it is 
not alone a defense for one of said parties to show 
that the other was also guilty of negligence which 
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contributed to cause the injury to the third party, if 
the third party was at and before the time of the 
happening of the accident in the exercise of ordinary 
care." 
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed upon the 
basis of the foregoing instruction. The court said : 
"* * * This instruction does not limit the 
negligence of defendant to that charged in the decla-
ration. It tells the jury that defendant would be liable 
for the injury if it was guilty of any negligence, 
whether it was charged in the declaration or not. The 
only negligence attempted to be charged in the decla-
ration is the negligent operation of the street car. 
The jury might assume that it was the duty of defen-
dant to keep the pavement on this street in repair, 
and that the presence of the holes in the pavement was 
the result of defendant's negligence. It might assume 
that the street car was negligently constructed, and 
·that the body of the car projected too far beyond the 
rails, and that the operation of the car with this un~ 
usually wide overhang was negligence on the part of 
defendant. It might assume any number of things 
which it might fancy or imagine was negligence on 
the part of defendant, and then, under this instruc-
tion, find defendant guilty. It is elementary that re-
covery can only be had upon the negligence charged 
in the declaration." 
Another example is Industrial Commission v. Wasatch 
Grading Company, supra. There the plaintiff recovered 
judgment for personal injuries alleged to have been caused 
by the defendant negligently running into him with a truck 
loaded with gravel. There was no allegation in the complaint 
that the defendant had failed to keep the steering device 
of the truck in proper repair. T'he trial court, however, in-
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structed the jury that testimony had been offered and re-
ceived to the effect that the steering device on the truck 
failed properly to operate and if they found that to be a fact, 
and that the steering device failed to function because of 
defendant's failure to keep it in proper repair, the verdict 
-should be for the plaintiff .. The judgment was reversed be-
cause of the error in this instruction. The Court said : 
"Defendant objected to the foregoing instruction and 
assigns the giving thereof as error. Nowhere in the 
complaint is it charged that the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to keep the steering device of the 
truck in question in proper repair. There is no gen-
eral language in the complaint which can be said to 
charge such negligence * * *. It is a well-estab-
lished rule of law in this, as well as other jurisdic-
tions, that the acts of negligence relied upon by the 
plaintiff for a recovery must be both alleged and 
proved. It is reversible error to instruct the jury 
that they may find a verdict for a plaintiff because 
of some negligence which is not pleaded or which is 
without support in the evidence." (citations) 
Moreover, the trial court's Instructions Nos. 7 and 8 in 
the instant case are prejudicial and erroneous for the further 
reason that in substance and effect they are mere statements 
of abstract principles of law, outside of the issues and the 
evidence. This court discussed this principle of law in 
Belnap v. Widdison, 32. Utah 246, 90 Pac. 393, where the 
plaintiff sought to recover damages to his crops caused by a 
flood which it was alleged the defendant negligently caused. 
The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could 
not sit passively by without trying to prevent the damage. 
There was no evidence, however, that the plaintiff had had 
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any opportunity to mitigate the damage. The instruction 
therefore was held reversible error, the court stating: 
"* * * The rule is well settled that instruc-
tions should be predicated upon the pleadings and 
evidence in the case, and that an instruction, even 
though it may contain a correct statement of the law 
in the abstract, if it has no application to the issues 
and evidence in the case, should be refused. The rea-
son for the rule is that instructions not pertinent to 
the c~se have a tendency to mislead the jury and to 
draw their minds from the issues in the case. The 
instruction, while it correctly states the law as an 
abstract proposition, has no application whatever to 
the facts in this case and was therefore erroneous, and 
the giving of it could not have been other than preju-
dicial to the interests of the plaintiff." 
Again, in Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, supra, this court 
criticized as error the giving of instructions on abstract 
principles of law, in the following language: 
"* * * The rule is well settled that in instructing 
a jury, a mere abstract or statement as to the law 
should be avoided, and that all instructions should be 
applicable to the evidence on either one or the other 
of the respective theories of the parties. Instruc-
tions which are not so applicable, though abstractly 
they may be correct, are not helpful to the jury, are 
apt to be misleading and to be improperly applied." 
In view of the authorities above cited, the conclusion 
necessarily follows that Instructions Nos. 7 and 8 in the 
present case were erroneous and prejudicial. 
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v. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
AS A MATTER OF' LAW THAT BOTH DEFENDANT 
AND THE DECEDANT WERE ENGAGED IN INTER-
STATE COMMERCE, AND THEREFORE THAT PLAIN-
TIFF WAS ENTITLED TO THE BENEF'IT OF THE 
REMEDY AFFORDED BY THE FEDERAL EMPLOY-
ERS' LIABIL,ITY kCT. 
In his complaint filed in this case, the plaintiff alleged 
in paragraph IV thereof that "on the tracks of the defen-
dant and within the yards where the fatal accident occured, 
defendant at all times herein mentioned maintained a high-
way of interstate commerce, and defendant was and now is 
engaged in interstate commerce and transportation in the 
States of Utah and Colorado, and decedent was employed 
by defendant in such commerce, and that the injuries re-
sulting in the death of decedent as herein complained of 
occurred in the course of and while he and defendant were 
mutually engaged in the conduct of interstate commerce and 
transportation by rail" (R. 2). In its Answer to the fore-
going allegation, the defendant entered both a general and 
a specific denial (R. 12). 
At the trial, the plaintiff rested his case in chief, with-
out putting in any evidence whatsoever with respect to the 
foregoing issue raised by the pleadings (R. 287). The de-
fendant introduced evidence with respect to other issues and 
then rested its case (R. 349). Counsel for plaintiff then 
again announced that plaintiff rested his case (R. 349). 
The trial court then stated in the presence of the jury "There 
was the matter of that stipulation you mentioned last night" 
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(R. 349). * Thereafter, the court allowed counsel for plain-
tiff to state orally, in the presence of the jury, a stipulation 
which had been previously agreed to by defense counsel. 
The stipulation was as follows: "The Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company is a railroad corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce by rail, in the States of 
Utah and Colorado, and that on the track where this accident 
occurred, and on adjacent tracks, coal is transported in 
both intrastate and interstate commerce (R. 3150). This stip-
ulation was the only evidence introduced at the trial on this 
all important issue. It will be noted that the foregoing stip-
ulation failed to cover the question of whether at the time 
of the accident, the defendant· and the decedent, or either, 
were engaged in interstate commerce, or specifically whether 
the cars of the defendant which decedent was riding at the 
time of his accident were moving in interstate commerce 
or whether the duties of the decedent at the time of the 
accident in any way directly or closely and substantially 
affected such interstate commerce. 
Instead of submitting this vital issue to the jury, or in 
view of the insufficiency of the evidence, of determining it 
in favor of the defendant as a matter of law, the trial court 
in its instructions to the jury proceeded to resolve the issue 
in favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law. In paragraph 
1 of its Instruction No. 6, the court stated: "You are in-
structed that the court has determined as a matter of law 
that the defendant and decedent were mutually engaged in 
*Although the record is silent, the facts are that after the close 
of court the previous evening, the trial judge called to the attention 
of counsel for plaintiff the lack of evidence with respect to this issue. 
Counsel for plaintiff then approached defense counsel with a proposed 
oral stipulation which was agreed to. 
\ 
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interstate commerce at the time and place of the fatal in-
juries to decedent as complaint [sic] of by plaintiff, and 
that any cause of action which plaintiff may have to recover 
damages for such injuries arises out of and is controlled by 
the Federal Statutes [presumably the court refers to the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Safety Appliance 
Act] hereinbefore referred to" ( R. 715) . The trial court also 
determined this issue against defendant as a matter of law 
by necessary implication in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Instruc-
tion No. 4. Exceptions were taken by the defendant to the 
whole of Instruction No. 4, and separately as to each offend-
ing paragraph thereof ( R. 358) . 
By its very terms, the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
is applicable only under particular circumstances where in-
terstate commerce is involved. The pertinent portion of the 
Act provides as follows: 
"Every common carrier by railroad while en-
gaging in commerce between any of the several states 
* * * shall be liable in damages to any person 
* * *' while he is employed by such carrier in 
such commerce * * * 
"Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose 
duties as such employee shall be in furtherance of 
interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way 
directly or closely and substantially, affect such com-
merce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of 
this chapter, be considered as being employed by such 
carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as 
entitled to the benefit of this chapter." 45 U. S. C. 
A. Sec. 51. 
Although the stipulation above referred to probably 
was sufficient to justify the trial court in holding, as it did 
~ t 
:~. 
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in paragraph 6 of its Instruction No. 4, that the defendant 
was subject to the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act 
(R. 72), the stipulation falls far short of supplying evidence 
that both the decedent and defendant were as a matter of 
law sufficiently eng·aged in interstate commerce at the time 
of the accident to come within the purview of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. The Safety Appliance Act applies 
to equipment used by a railroad even in intrastate commerce, 
provided the railroad is a highway of int~rstate commerce. 
Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 2'41 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 
482. But the Federal Employers' Act affords a cause of 
action only where the employer is engaged in interstate com-
merce and the employee also has duties either in furtherance 
of interstate commerce or directly or closely and substantial-
ly affecting such commerce. 
In the case at bar it may be conceded under all the evi-
dence, together with the stipulation referred to, that: the 
decedent, Thomas, was a brakeman in the employ of de-
fendant at the time of the accident resulting in his death; 
he was riding cars of coal from the load track at Sunnyside, 
Utah, onto the bin track and therice to the bin just prior to 
the accident resulting in his death ; on the tracks where the 
accident to decedent occurred and on adjacent tracks, coal 
is transported generally in both interstate and intrastate 
commerce; defendant is a railroad corporation engaged in 
interstate commerce. It is not conceded and there is no 
evidence that: ( 1) the particular cars on which decendent 
was riding at the time of the accident were moving in inter-
state commerce, or (2) the duties of the decendent at the 
time of his injury were either in furtherance ~f interstate 
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commerce or in any way directly or closely and substantially 
affecting such commerce. 
The most that the plaintiff possibly could claim under 
the foregoing circumstances would be that an issue of fact 
had been created for determination by the jury. Instead, 
the trial court resolved the issue as a matter of law in favor 
of the plaintiff. This was contrary to law and constitutes 
reversible error. 
A vance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N. E. (2d) 57, cert. 
denied 323 U. S. 753', 65 S. Ct. 8~, is a recent case directly 
in point. In that case the plaintiff was riding one of a cut 
of cars being moved in a switching operation in connection 
with the making up of a train which was to move from 
Bismark, Missouri to Poplar Bluff, Missouri. Plaintiff fell 
from the car he was riding and was injured, due to the al-
leged negligence of the defendant. There was disputed evi-
dence as to whether one or more of the cars involved were 
being moved in interstate commerce during the switching 
movement, and therefore as to whether at the time of ac-
cident and injury to plaintiff the work in which he was 
engaged was in furtherance of interstate commerce. Not-
withstanding the state of the evidence, the trial court in-
structed the jury as a matter of law that the plaintiff and 
defendant were engaged in interstate commerce at the time 
the accident occurred. The Supreme Court of Illinois held 
this to be reversible error, stating as follows : 
"* * * We are not convinced that plaintiff's dut-
ies at the time of the accident are so conclusively 
shown to be in furtherance of, or were so substantially 
connected with, interstate commerce as to authorize 
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the trial court to decide such question as one of law 
instead of leaving it to the jury. 
"The allegation in the complaint that the plain-
tiff's duties were in connection with interstate com-
merce was one of the contested issues in the case, 
and raises the question whether, under the facts, the 
trial court should have instructed the jury that such 
allegation had been established as a matter of law. 
The rule laid down is that where the facts are in 
dispute, or more than one inference can be drawn 
from them, the question whether the injured employ-
ee was at the time in interstate commerce is a ques-
tion for the jury. Pennsylvania Co. v. Donat, 239 
U. S. 50, 36 S. Ct. 4, 60 L. Ed. 139'; Southern Rail-
road Co. v. Lloyd, 239 U. S. 496,, 36 S. Ct. 210, 60 L. 
Ed. 402. The amendment of 1939, U. S. C. A. Title 
No. 45, Sec. 51, has not changed the rule in this re-
spect." 
The apparent aim of the 1939 Amendment to the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act was to eliminate the necessity 
of determining whether an employee, at the very instant of 
his injury or death, was actually engaged in the movement 
of interstate traffic, thereby enlarging the group to be bene-
fited by the Act. See H oll v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 F. Supp. 
21, 23. Yet, the Act still requires a finding that at the time 
of the accident, the duties of the employee "shall be in fur-
therance of interstate * * * commerce" or in some way 
"directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce." 
Otherwise, the statute means that Congress intended to in-
clude all employees of interstate railroads under the Act. 
As stated in H oll v. Southern Pac. Co., supra: 
"It was, no doubt, the object of the amendment 
to enlarge the railroad transportation group to be 
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benefited by the Act. This was achieved not by chang-
ing the main section, but by adding a new clause to 
it. The main section still left the test of liability that 
the 'employee be 'employed by such carrier in such 
commerce'. However, the new clause increased the 
group by adding those whose duties, in whole or in 
part, directly, closely or substantially affect inter-
state commerce. (citation) 
"The plaintiff was employed as a clerk in the 
freight claim department * * *. Her work * * * 
was in no way a part of interstate commerce or in 
furtherance of it. 
* * * 
"* * * I do not think that it was the intention 
of the Congress to include such employees [i. e. em-
ployees such as the plaintiff] and to withdraw them 
from the protection of State Employers' Liability 
Laws. On the contrary, I am of the view that had 
Congress intended to include them, it would have 
amended the first part of Section 51 ,by omitting the 
words 'in such commerce'. This would have extended 
the Act to 'any person suffering injury while he is 
employed by such carrier,' and would have placed 
all employees of interstate railroad under the Act, 
·whether their work be clerical or not, or in any way 
connected with the interstate commerce or not. It 
would have made the sole test the interstate nature 
of the business of the carrier. This it could have done 
constitutionally even if it had included employees and 
activities clearly local and intrastate. 
* * * 
"But the Congress did not do so. And I do not 
find in the cases which have arisen under the amend-
ment any judicial sanction for doing it by interpre-
tation. · 
* * * 
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"In sum, I feel that the wording of the 19'39 
Amendment, its legislative history, and the interpre-
. tation which the courts have placed upon it, stand 
in the way of the plaintiff's right to recovery in this 
case." 
An employee of a railroad company is not entitled to 
sue and claim the benefits of the remedy provided by Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, unless it is first determined either 
by a court or a jury that both the carrier and the employer 
were engaged in interstate commerce, when the employee's 
injury or death occurred. A failure to make a proper dispo-
sition of this preliminary question, constitutes a jurisdic-
tional defect, striking at the heart of the statutory rem-
edy sought by the plaintiff in the present case. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that the failure of the trial court in the 
· case at bar to submit to the jury the issue of interstate com-
merce was plain error, jurisdictional in nature, and should 
be corrected by an order for a new trial. 
VI 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO SET'-OFF AGAINST 
THE JUDGMENT, IF ANY, IS EXPRESSLY AUTHOR-
IZED BY STATUTE. " 
Prior to trial of this case, but after complaint and 
answer, the defendant filed a claim for set-off in the amount 
of $4,923.98 against any judgment which the plaintiff might 
be awarded in the pe.nding action (R. 16-18). This claim was 
included in·defendant's amended answer and alleged in sub-
stance that: (1) the defendant had contributed certain sums 
to the Treasury of the United States for the benefit of its 
employees upon their retirement or for the benefit of the 
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immediate dependents of such employees in the event of the 
death of the employees before their retirement; (2) on ac-
count of the death of Gerald D. Thomas, his dependent widow 
and minor children had received or were entitled to receive 
from the contributions so made by the defendant, certain 
annuity payments in stipulated amounts; ( 3) of such an-
nuities, the defendant had contributed one-half of the sums 
payable and defendant therefore was entitled to a set-off 
of an. amount equivalent to one-half of the present value of 
such annuities (R. 16-18). On motion of the plaintiff, the 
trial court struck this claim for set-off from the pleadings 
and sustained a general demurrer thereto filed by the 
plaintiff (R. 3-69). 
The defendant bases its right to a set-off such as pleaded 
upon the provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Employers' . :i:'!!~ 
Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 55, which reads as follows: 
"* * * That in any action brought against 
any such common carrier under or by virtue of any 
of the provisions of this chapter, such common car-
rier may set off therein any sum it has contributed 
or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity 
that may have been paid to the injured employee or 
the person entftled thereto on account of the injury 
or death for which said action was brought." 
Certainly, the allegations of defendant's pleading with refer-
ence to set-off, established a claim within the literal language 
of the quoted statute. In its argument in the trial court, 
however, plaintiff relied upon certain cases which he claimed 
supported the proposition that such a set-off should not be 
authorized. A review of the cases cited by plaintiff follows: 
··m 
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McCarthy v. Palmer, et al., 113 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 2) 
is a case in which the defendants, railroad trustees, claimed 
that they were entitled to a set-off or reduction of the plain-
tiff's judgment to the extent of an annuity payable under 
the Railroad Retirement Act to individuals totally and perm-
anently disabled for regular employment. Defendants also 
claimed a set-off equal to the amount of the annuity plain-
tiff would be eligible to receive upon reaching the age of 
60, computed upon the basis of plaintiff's life expectancy 
or in the alternative, to a set off to the extent of defendant's 
contributions to such annuity. The Circuit Court held that 
no set-off should be permitted for the reason that the plain-
tiff has not been brought by the evidence and findings 
within any class entitled to benefits under the Railroad Re-
tirement Act. With respect to defendant's claim that the 
plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled within the 
meaning of the act, the parties stipulated that the trial judge 
should decide the issue on the evidence, and the judge failed 
to find that the plaintiff was so disabled. This finding ap-
parently was not questioned on appeal. With reference to 
defendant's claim that the plaintiff will be eligible for an 
annuity upon reaching the age of 60, the proof indicated that 
plaintiff had not yet attained that age. 
It is to be noted that the claim for set-off in the M c-
Carthy v. Palmer case was disposed of on the basis of a 
failure of proof to show that plaintiff was presently entitled 
to any annuity benefits. Of course under such circumstances 
no set-off could be allowed, but not because ·the claim was 
improper as a matter of law. In the case at bar, on the other_ 
hand, the pleading alleges that particular persons "entitled 
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thereto" had received or were entitled to receive the annuities 
payable, on account of the death of Gerald Dallas Thomas, 
for which said action was brought. Whether or not the de-
fendant could prove this allegation is beside the point. The 
allegation was made in good faith and states a proper ground 
for set-off. The defendant should be permitted to introduce 
evidence to support its allegations, just as the defendants in 
the McCarthy v. Palmer case were permitted to do. 
Chiefly relied upon by plaiiJtiff in his argument before 
the trial court was the case of Hetrick v. Reading Co., 39· F. 
Supp. 22 (Dist. Ct., N. J.). This was a suit under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act for damages on account of 
personal injuries, and in which the plaintiff claimed that he 
was totally and permanently disabled. In partial answer to 
the complaint, the defendant alleged that if plaintiff were 
totally and permanently disabled as alleged, he was entitled 
to receive an annuity of a certain amount under the Railroad 
Retirement Act, and if plaintiff was entitled to damages 
from defendant, such damages should be mitigated by de-
ducting the present value of the annuity due for the re-
mainder of plaintiff's life. Plaintiff made a motion to strike 
this defense from the pleadings, which the trial court 
granted. The trial court held that the fund created by con-
tributions from the employer and the employee was the in-
herent right of the employee which became crystalized upon 
the occurrence of designated prerequisites. The provisions 
of the Railroad Retirement Act and the F'ederal Employers' 
Liability Act could be comingled, said the court, and it was 
not true as urged by the defendant, that the railroad would 
; 
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be paying twice for the same injury. Also the court did not 
think that an annuity based upon total and permanent dis-
ability was ever intended as compensation. Finally, the 
court concluded that it did not appear that the plaintiff 
had yet received any benefits out of the fund to which the 
defendant had contributed. Furthermore, it did not appear 
that any benefits would be paid to plaintiff in the future so 
far as the "proofs" were concerned, unless the Railroad Re-
tirement Board granted plaintiff such relief, and even if an 
annuity were granted, its continuance would be uncertain 
because it would depend upon continuance of the disability. 
The reasoning of the opinion is not too clear. It would 
be interesting to know for example, what "proofs" the court 
referred to in its opinion, since the only problem before it 
was the legal sufficiency of defendant's plea of set-off. Be 
that as it may, none of the "reasoning" of the court 'in the 
Hetrick case is at variance with the defendant's contentions 
in the present case-. For instance, it· is not disputed in the 
case at bar, but that the right to payments of stipulated an-
nuities to the widow and children of deceased under the 
Retirement Act becomes crystallized upon the occurrence 
of designate'd prerequisites. Defendant's pleading alleges 
that these prerequisites have occurred. Nor does defendant 
make any attempt to comingle the Railroad Retirement 
Act and the Federal Employers' Liability ·Act, on the 
ground that a dual recover for the same injury would be 
provided. In Hetrick case, the defendant's pleading and 
"proof" were apparently faulty. Moreover, the court's 
"reasoning'' in that case seems to disregard entirely the ex-
press authorization for set-off contained in Section 5 of the 
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Federal. Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 55. 
The court seems to lose itself in concern over whether or 
not double recovery would be permitted and then rejects 
the claim for set-off on the ground that an annuity under 
the Railroad Retirement Act was not intended as compensa-
tion for negligent injury by a carrier. In the case at bar, 
however, the defendant makes no contention either that 
such annuities are intended as compensation or that double 
recovery would be permitted unless a set-off were allowed. 
It is submitted therefore that the Hetrick case offers dubious 
authority for plaintiff's position. 
Defendant does not contend that any right to set-off 
would exist in this case, except for the specific provisions of 
the statute involved, namely, Section 5 of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 55. That statute 
states in plain language that in any action brought against 
the carrier under the provisions of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, the carrier may set-off its contributions to 
any insurance or relief benefit that may have been paid to 
the person entitled thereto on account of the death for which 
the action was brought. Defendant's pleading alleges the 
exact situation set forth in the statute. There is nothing 
in the Railroad Retirement Act inconsistent with such a 
claim or with the statute upon which the claim is founded. 
This same subject was discussed, incidently, in Chi-
cago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Peeler, 140 F. (2d) 865, 
(C.C.A. 8). In that case the defendant contended the trial 
court erred in rejecting its offer of proof that "the plaintiff 
has since his accident in this case rece'ived a pension from 
the Railroad Retirement Board; that one-half of that pension 
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was paid for by the Railroad Company and one-half by the 
plaintiff himself." This offer was objected to by the plain-
tiff and the objection sustained. Upon appeal, it was held 
that the offer of proof was properly excluded for the reason 
that no claim for set-off had been asserted in the defendant's 
answer. The Circuit Court stated: 
"The question presented is interesting. It has 
been discussed by the courts in McCarthy. v. Palmer, 
2 Cir., 113 F. (2d) 721, 723, and ·in Hetrick v. Read-
ing Co., D. C. N. J., 39 F. Supp. 22. Neither case is 
helpful here. In the McCarthy case the question arose 
on an appeal from a finding of the court as a result 
of a stipulation, and in the Hetrick case on a motion 
to strike an affirmative claim for a set-off under 
the Act. In the present case no claim to a set-off is 
asserted in the answer. The objection, therefore, 
that the offered evidence was not material or rele-
vant to any issue was properly sustained. * * * 
"Appellant contends that it was entitled to make 
proof of the pension on cross examination of the 
plaintiff in mitigation of damages. If appellant is 
entitled to any benefit in this action from its contri-
butions to the Railroad Retirement fund it is byway 
of set-off only, as provided in the statute. Wit~out 
the aid of the statute an employer can not set up in 
mitigation of damages in a tort action by an injured 
employee, indemnity from a collateral source, such 
as insurance or compensation or benefits under a 
Workmen's Compensation Act, even where the de-
fendant has contributed to the fund. Overland Const. 
Co. v. Sydnor, 6 Cir., 70 F. (2d) 3'38, 340; Liggett & 
Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Parcq, 8 Cir., 6,6 F 1• 2d 678, 
687 688; 25 C. J. S., Damages, Sec. 99. We are not 
called upon, therefore, to decide whether a pension 
under the Railroad Retirement Act is a proper set-off 
to the plaintiff's claim, or whether it is excluded un-
der Sec. 58, supra, of the Federal Employers' Liabil-
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ity Act. The objection to the offered proof was prop-
erly sustained in any event for the reason that the 
claim for set-off was not in issue." 
It will be noted that in both the Hetrick and the Peeler 
ca.c;es·, Section 8 of the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act, 
45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 58, is mentioned as a possible obstacle to 
a set off under the provisions of Section 5 of the same Act. 
Section 8 reads as follows: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall be held to limit 
the duty or liability of common carriers or to impair 
the rights of their employees under any other Act 
or Acts of Congress." 
The argument apparently is that since tne right to annuities 
or pensions arise under the provision of the Railroad Retire-
ment Act, allowance of a set-off of these annuities under 
Section 5 would limit the possible liability of the carrier and 
impair rights of the employee under the Railroad Retire-
ment Act. No argument could be more tenuous or illogical. 
The rights of the employee or others e;ntitled to benefits or 
annuities under the Railroad Retirement Act is not ques-
tioned or sought to be impaired by a claim for set-off under 
Section 5 of the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act. The 
continued receipt of such benefits or annuities by the em-
ployee or other person entitled thereto· would in no way be 
impair'ed. Any judgment recovered in the negligence action 
brought on account of the injury. or death of the employee 
would be limited by deduction of an amount equivalent to 
the defendant's contribution to the annuities received, but 
the continued payment of the annuities themselves to the 
person entitled to them would not be interrupted. So also, 
:ii 
~I 
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there would be nothing in such a set-off which in any degree 
would lessen the legal duty or liability of the carrier to 
respond in damages for its negligent acts. The fact that the 
amount of the judgment for damages would be diminished 
to the extent of the set-off established would not constitute 
a limitation upon the carriers' legal duty. 
It is submitted that defendant's right to set-off was 
properly stated in its pleading in this case denominated 
"Amended Answer," and that Section 5 of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act expressly authorizes such a set-off. 
For the reasons stated, the several cases involving this 
question cited by the plaintiff below, in no way modify the 
express authority of this statute. In striking defendant's 
plea for set-off, the trial court improperly deprived the 
defendant of a right conferred on the carrier by the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. 
VH. 
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE AND THE TRTAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
. " 
ORDER A REDUCTION IN THE AMOUNT OR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The trial court instructed the jury that any award of 
damages was limited to the pecuniary loss sustained by the 
deceased's wife and minor children, that is, the present value 
of the sum the deceased would have contributed to his family 
from his earnings (R. 84). It is important therefore to 
examine the record made at the trial with respect to de-
ceased's earnings and the amount of contributions made to 
his family from such earnings. The evidence on the subject 
was as follows : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
66 
On direct examination, Mrs. Thomas, the wife of the de-
ceased, was asked the following question and made the fol-
lowing answer ( R. 269) . 
"Q. Now, while your husband was employed on 
the railroad about how much did he bring home a 
month, about how much did he make a month, would 
you say?1 
"A. Two hundred fifty to two hundred seventy-
five, I imagine." 
Apparently the answer given was not what counsel expected 
or hoped the witness would say and counsel pressed the 
point with several additional questions, finally eliciting the 
statement that the total earnings of the deceased while he 
was working on the railroad were from $300 to $350 per 
month (R. 269). Mrs. Thomas then said that on an average 
$250 to $275 was spent each month to maintain herself and 
deceased's children (R. 270). 
But on cross-examination, Mrs. Thomas' testimony 
painted an entirely different picture with r~spect to the 
amount of deceased's earnings. It was true, she said,' that 
the deceased was granted a leave of absence from his rail-
road employment on October 10, 1946,, that on January 9, 
194:7 he was granted a further leave of absence for 60 days. 
On May 23, 194 7, Thomas was granted another 30 days' 
leave of absence, and on June 23, 1947 he wa's granted an 
additional 30 days' leave (R. 27'6). On July 23, 1947, 
Thomas' leave was further extended to August 22, 1947. 
During the year 1947, Thomas had worked for the railroad 
about 4 months prior to the accident (R. 277). From Jan-
uary through April, 1947, Thomas received no earnings 
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from the railroad at all. In May, 1947, Thomas worked only 
a very brief time and his check for that month was $51.80 
(R. 277, 278). In June, 1947, Thomas didn't work for the 
railroad at all and received no earnings. In July, 1947, his 
earnings were only $29.92. During August, 1947, Thomas' 
earnings were $2'57.89 (R. 278). In September, 1947, 
'!1hoTTI!ls' check from the railroad was $217.58. So that for 
the whole year 1947 prior to the accident, Thomas' average 
monthly earnings, counting only the months he actually 
worked, were $138.77 (R. 279). According to Mrs. Thomas, 
during the time that her husband was off on leaves of 
absence from the railroad, he did some construction work. 
·His earnings from construction work were around $300 
per month (R. 282). For two months in 1947, Thomas was 
off work and spent his time working on their house at Fruita. 
He earned no money from any source during these two 
months (R. 283). 
With respect to the deductions which should be made 
from deceased's earning on account of his own expenses and 
maintenance, Mrs. Thomas stated that the deceased's ex-
penses away from home while doing railroad work were 
$50 to $7'5 per month, but she never kept any particular 
track of it (R. 270). She admitted also that in January, 
1947, Thomas was working in the Salt Lake Division and he 
wrote a letter to the Superintendent requesting a leave of 
absence for 60 to 90 days, for the reason that his residence 
was in Fruita, Colorado, and he couldnt make enough above 
his expenses in Salt Lake to maintain his home (R. 279, 280). 
In addition to his board bill for meals and lodging while 
away from home, Thomas paid out a certain amount of 
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money each month for his own clothing and for personal 
incidental expenses such as tobacco and the like (R. 280-
281) . When at home, Thomas ate his share of the groceries 
(R. 281). The deceased would be home about 4 days and 
away from home about 3 days each week in connection with 
his work on the railroad (R. 271). According to Brakeman 
Schauster, he and Thomas had lived at the some rooming 
house at Sunnyside. The board bill at this rooming house 
was $65.00 per month. This rate was cheaper than what a 
brakeman ordinarily has to pay for his living expenses when 
away from home (R. 259). Expenses usually run from $3.00 
to $3.50 per day when away from home, or from $90 to $100 
per month for only meals and lodging (R. 260). 
According to the testimony of .. w. E. Myrick, Trust 
Officer of the First Security Trust Co., a person of ordinary 
prudence, without special skill, could invest money and ex-
pect a yield of between 23/t% to 3,% interest (R. 234). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit T, admitted in evidence over defen-
dant's objection, indicates that the present value of a month-
ly annuity of $200, discounted at 23~%, for a person of the 
age and with the expectancy of the deceased, would amount 
to a little more than $50,000, the amount of the verdict in 
this· case. Since there was no evidence of conscious pain or 
suffering upon which any money award could be based, 
it is apparent that the jury must have assumed in the 
present case that the deceased's net monthly contributions 
to his family approximated $200 per month. Such an 
assumption is contrary to the evidence given by Mrs. Thomas 
upon cross-examination, with respect to the deceased's earn-
ings. It submitted in this connection that Mrs. Thomas 
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should be regarded as a party to the action and the court 
should consider that_portion of her testimony as true which 
bears most strongly against her interest. This principle 
is well settled in the law. Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal 
Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594; Casey v. Northern Pacific Ry. 
Co., 60 Mont. 56, 198 Pac. 141. 
A tabulation of the evidence as admitted by Mrs. 
Thomas, shows that during the year 19·47 the deceased's 
earnings from the railroad were as follows : 
January through April .. 
May 
None 
. $ 51.80 
....... None June.·. 
July 
August 
September 
October 
Total 
2-9.92 
2·57.89 
217.58 
136.66 
. . . . . . . $·6·9'3.85 
On the basis of the four months ,.when he actually worked, 
Thomas' average monthly earnings would be about $138.77. 
Mrs. Thomas also admitted that during 2 months of 
1947 Thomas didn't work at all (R. 2831), but said that dur-
ing the time when deceased was not working for the rail-
road or was not at home, he did construction work at the 
rate of $300 per month. On this basis, and excluding· the 
month of October, 1947 when Thomas' accident and death 
occurred, his total earnings from all sources would be about 
as follows for the nine month period : 
January ... 
February 
None (assumed to be the two months 
N ~ne when Thomas did no work) 
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March .. $300.00 (construction) 
April 300.00 (construction) 
May . . . . . . . 51.80(railroad) 
June 300.00(construction) 
July 29.92 (railroad) 
August 257.89 (railroad) 
September 2'17 .58 (railroad) 
Total ... $1,457.19 
The above total earnings of $1,457.19 would represent an 
average for the nine month period of $161.91 per month, 
before any deductions on account of the deceased's personal 
expenses. There is nothing in the record regarding Thomas' 
earning for years prior to 19,47, or any indication that his 
earnings for prior years were either greater or less than 
in 1947. 
Thomas' expenses when away from home would amount 
to at least $3.00 to $3.50 per day, not including such personal 
expenses as clothing, tobacco, and his share of food while 
at home. On the average, his railroad work required him to 
be away from home about 3 days out of a week, according 
to Mrs. Thomas. She estimated also that the deceased's ex-
penses were $~50 to $75 per month. If Thomas' own expenses 
were subtracted from the average monthly earning figure 
of $161.92 per month, it would leave in round figures about 
$100 per month, which he may have contributed to the sup-
port of his family. This probably would be a generous esti-
mate of the true fact. 
If a verdict were computed on this ~asis by means of 
plaintiff's convenient time table for computation of high 
verdicts, Exhibit T, at a discount of 2%, %, the result would 
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be a verdict of about $25,000, or about half the amount of 
the verdict actually returned. It is clear, therefore, that on 
the basis of the testimony adduced at the trial and even on 
the basis of plaintiff's own Exhibit T, the verdict returned 
by the jury is excessive and unreasonable. Even if some 
reasonable amount were added to the verdict on account of 
the pecuniary value of the deceased's care and training to 
his minor children during their minority, the verdict as 
rendered would still be grossly excessive. Moreover, a search 
of the case books by defendant's counsel has failed to reveal 
a single death case where any court has sustained a verdict 
as large as in the present case, where the 'deceased's record 
of earnings and contributions to dependents in any degree 
were comparable to that shown by the evidence in the case at 
bar. 
Defendant is not una ware of the rulings of this Court to 
the effect it is "slow to interfere with a ruling granting or 
refusing a new trial on questions relating to damages." 
Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P. (2d) 191, 198. 
Nevertheless, this Court has said that it is not "powerless 
to grant relief if it should indubitably appear that the jurors 
erred in their judgment as to the amount of damages." 
JY!iller v. Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. (2d) 865, 
879. And this Court has affirmed its willingness to correct 
injustice if "the record clearly indicates the presence of bias, 
prejudice, passion or misunderstanding on the part of the 
jury in arriving at its verdict." Allison V. McCarthy, 106 
Utah 278, 147 P. (2d) 870, 873. When a verdict is challenged 
as excessive in the lower court, the trial judge may (1) 
grant a new trial if it appears that the verdict is the result 
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of passion or prejudice, or (2) if it appears merely that the 
jury "have misjudged the evidence, or may have erred in 
their judgment ~especting the amount that should be allowed 
* * * the error may be cured by requiring the plaintiff 
to remit the excess." Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 5e8, 161 Pac. 459, 462. In any. 
event, the action of the trial court is subject to review in 
this Court for an abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Denver & 
R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, 1192; Geary v. Cain, 
69 Utah 340, 255 Pac. 416, 418. 
It is submitted that the verdict returned by· the jury 
in the present case indicates that the evidence respecting 
damages was completely misunderstood or ignored; that the 
amount of the verdict not only indicates that the jury erred 
in its judgment, but also that it was arrived at on the basis 
of bias and prejudice. Under the circumstances, the trial 
court should have reduced the verdict or granted a new trial. 
This abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court is 
sufficiently flagrant that this Court should rev1ew and cor-
. rect the injustice~ 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the trial court committed serious 
errors during the trial of this case. As herein demonstrated, 
the court erroneously submitted several issues to the jury 
when there was no evidence to support a verdict based upon 
such issues; .it erroneously and prejudicially instructed the 
jury with respect to several important issues in the case, and 
also erred in deciding several matters contrary to law. 
Further, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
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take corrective action with respect to the grossly excessive 
verdict returned by the jury. 
Under the above circumstances, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that this Court should reverse and remand the judg-
ment below, with instructions to grant a new trial. 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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